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Robust Website Fingerprinting Through the Cache Occupancy Channel

Anatoly Shusterman

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Anatoly Shusterman

Speaker Name: Anatoly Shusterman
Title: Robust Website Fingerprinting Through the Cache Occupancy Channel
Date: 01th July 2020
Time: 04:00 pm IST

Abstract

Website fingerprinting attacks, which use statistical analysis on network traffic to compromise user privacy, have been shown to be effective even if the traffic is sent over anonymity-preserving networks such as Tor. The classical attack model used to evaluate website fingerprinting attacks assume an on-path adversary, who can observe all traffic traveling between the user's computer and the secure network.

This talk introduces a different attack model, in which the adversary is capable of sending a small amount of malicious JavaScript code to the target user's computer. The malicious code mounts a cache side-channel attack, which exploits the effects of contention on the CPU's cache, to identify other websites being browsed.

Refs: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec19-shusterman.pdf

About Speaker

Ph.D. student at the Information Systems Engineering Department at Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel. He specializes in machine learning and big data analytics.

His research interests include Hardware side-channel attacks and Machine Learning algorithms.

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